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NOTES
Workers' Compensation-Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Irings Yarn:
Leaving Precedent in the Dust?
Considered one of the five most dangerous occupational substances,1 cot-
ton dust already has contributed to the disability of up to 11,000 textile work-
ers in North Carolina.2 Because most of these workers' disabilities cannot be
completely attributed to their occupational exposure,3 the issue of apportion-
ment of workers' compensation awards according to occupational and nonoc-
cupational causes is of great significance to workers, employers, and policy
makers.4
The recent North Carolina Supreme Court case of Rutledge v. Tultex
Corp./Kings Yarn5 allows a plaintiff to be compensated fully even when his
disease is caused in part by nonoccupational factors.6 In a 4-3 decision, the
court determined that apportionment of benefits is unnecessary when a
worker's disability is caused completely by chronic obstructive lung disease to
which occupational exposure has contributed significantly.7 Crucial to the
court's decision was its declaration that Rutledge's occupational disease was
"chronic obstructive lung disease"8 rather than the traditionally recognized
occupational disease "byssinosis." 9 By characterizing chronic obstructive lung
disease as an occupational disease, the court was able to avoid, and severely
1. C. FRANKEL, 5A LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, § 33.59a, at 24 (rev. ed. Supp. 1980)
(800,000 workers nationwide risk byssinosis).
2. Ellis, The Brown Lung Battle, 4 N.C. INSIGHT 16, 16 (1981). But see Davis, Chronic Ob-
structive Lung and Cardiovascular Diseases, in N.C. BAR Assoc. FOUNDATION, WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION VII-67 (1979) (strict scientific justification supports estimate of only 500).
3. See IB A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41.64(b), at 7-432 (1982)
(byssinosis seldom occurs without history of smoking). See also Ellis, supra note 2, at 19 (state-
ment of William Stephenson, Chairman, N.C. Indus. Comm'n) ("In more than 90% of the [cotton
dust] cases that come before us, the claimants have some malady other than byssinosis.").
4. See generally Note, Apportionment of Disabilities is Limited Under the North Carolina Act,
54 N.C.L. REV. 1123 (1976).
5. 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
6. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 370.
7. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
8. The broad term "chronic obstructive lung disease" describes a condition caused by one or
more specific lung diseases (bronchitis, byssinosis, emphysema, etc.) which in their chronic stages
are generally medically indistinguishable. See id at 94, 301 S.E.2d at 366; A. BouHUYs, J.
SCHOENBERG, G. BECK & R. SCHILLING, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a Cotton Mill
Community, 5 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 607 (Service Vol.
1978).
9. "Byssinosis," commonly known as brown lung disease, is a bronchial irritation often
found in workers exposed to cotton dust. While the disease frequently possesses unique character-
istics in its acute stages, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-Administrative
Law, 59 N.C.L. REV. 1017, 1036 n.161 (1981) (describing the "classical history" of brown lung
development), byssinosis in its chronic stages generally is considered to be medically indistin-
guishable from other specific chronic obstructive lung diseases. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 94-95, 301
S.E.2d at 366.
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limit the precedential value of, Morrison v. Burlington Industries,10 which had
required apportionment when the narrower occupational disease of byssinosis
was found to be partially responsible for a plaintiff's disability."l
The Rutledge court's apparent departure from precedent sparked consid-
erable controversy that began with the filing of a lengthy dissenting opinion
and culminated in a legislative proposal designed to negate the Rutledge hold-
ing.' 2 Although the effort to overrule Rutledge legislatively failed, the Rut-
ledge rule has not settled the issue of apportionment in lung disease cases.
Instead, by not expressly overruling the Morrison case and its progeny, i3 the
Rutledge opinion has further complicated the already confusing workers' com-
pensation law governing "dual causation."' 4 This note examines the success
and significance of the Rutledge court's attempts to reconcile its result with the
Morrison apportionment rule.
Plaintiff Margaret Rutledge worked for twenty-three years in various cot-
ton mills prior to her employment with defendant Kings Yarn in 1976.15 Her
pulmonary impairment began in 1969 with a cough at work and progressed
until 1979 when it disabled her from all but "sedentary work. . . in a clean
environment."' 6 Rutledge had been exposed to respirable cotton dust in all of
the mills, but her exposure was less severe in defendant's newer, cleaner mill
than in the others.' 7 She also smoked approximately one pack of cigarettes
per day throughout her period of employment in the cotton industry.' 8
The Industrial Commission's pulmonary specialist diagnosed Rutledge as
having "chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, with [elements] of pulmonary
emphysema and chronic bronchitis."' 19 He opined that plaintiffs exposure to
cotton dust "probably was a cause" of her lung disease,20 although cigarette
smoking was "one of the more probable causes." 21 He also stated that her
lung problems were "caused by circumstances which existed prior to her em-
10. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).
11. Id. at 13, 282 S.E.2d at 467.
12. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
13. Walston v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982), amendedon reh ', 305
N.C. 296, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982); Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).
For a detailed discussion of Morrison as well as these cases, see Note, You Take (4.5% 0) my
Breath 4way-Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 4 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Note, (45% o)9 my Breath!; Note, Apportionment ofDisabiliy Compensation-Morrison v.
Burlington Industries, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 801 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Apportionment].
14. "Dual causation" refers to the causation problem when a personal element such as smok-
ing combines with an employment element to produce lung disease. A. LARSON, supra note 3,
§ 41.64(a), at 7-424.
15. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 361-62.
16. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 361.
19. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
20. Id. at 90-91, 301 S.E.2d at 363. The expert also stated that Rutledge did "not give a
classical history of byssinosis," id. at 123, 301 S.E.2d at 382 (Meyer, J., dissenting), although he
admitted that textile workers are at an increased risk of developing chronic lung disease "irrespec-
tive" of whether they show such a history, id. at 112, 301 S.E.2d at 376 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
21. Id at 92, 301 S.E.2d at 364.
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ployment [by Kings Yarn],' 22 although plaintiff's Kings Yam exposure could
have had "some [minimally] aggravating effect on [her] underlying condi-
tion."23 The Deputy Industrial Commissioner determined that because Rut-
ledge's exposure at Kings Yarn had "neither caused nor significantly
contributed" to plaintiffs disease,24 she had "not contracted chronic obstruc-
tive lung disease as a result of any exposure while working with defendant
employer." 25 The full Industrial Commission subsequently adopted the dep-
uty's findings and conclusion as its OWn.26
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the Commission had
erred in requiring Rutledge to prove that her last employment had caused an
occupational disease rather than simply allowing her to prove it to have been
the last job to injuriously expose her to cotton dust.27 The court found the
error harmless, however, because the court agreed with the Commission's con-
clusion that the plaintiff had not contracted an occupational disease.28
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that
the Commission had erred in requiring Rutledge to prove that exposure at her
last employment had done anything more than "proximately [augment] her
disease to any extent, however slight."'29 A majority of the supreme court dis-
agreed that the error was harmless, however, because they believed that suffi-
cient evidence existed to support a finding that Rutledge's chronic obstructive
lung disease was a compensable occupational disease.30 Over a lengthy and
vigorous dissent, the majority held that a worker could be compensated to the
full extent of disability caused by chronic obstructive lung disease3' if her cot-
ton dust exposure significantly contributed to that disease.32
Although North Carolina recognized compensable occupational diseases
as early as 1935,33 byssinosis has never appeared on the statutory list of prima
facie occupational diseases.34 Cotton dust claimants therefore found it neces-
22. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yam, 56 N.C. App. 345, 347, 289 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
23. Id. at 347, 289 S.E.2d at 73.
24. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 88, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Rutledge, 56 N.C. App. at 350, 289 S.E.2d at 74.
28. Id. It does not appear that the Commission reached such a conclusion. The Commission
merely had ruled that Rutledge had not contracted an occupational disease as a result of her
exposure at defendant's plant. See New Supreme Court Brief for Appellant at 15, Rutledge, 308
N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
29. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
30. Id. at 90, 301 S.E.2d at 363. Chronic obstructive lung disease was found to meet the
requirements of North Carolina's catch-all occupational disease provision, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
53(13) (1979). See infra text accompanying note 35.
31. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 107, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
32. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
33. Act of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130. For a discussion of the
gradual development of workers' compensation law in this area, see Note, Development of North
Carolina Occupational Disease Coverage, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341 (1971).
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1979). Prima facie occupational diseases in North Caro-
lina include asbestosis, id § 97-53 (24), and silicosis, id § 97-53 (25), as well as diseases such as
carbon monoxide poisoning, id § 97-53 (22), which are not purely occupational in nature.
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sary to rely on North Carolina's catch-all provision, which currently deems
occupational "any disease ...proven to be due to causes and conditions
which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, or
employment but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is equally exposed." 35 In 1979, after the catch-all provision had been
amended three times36 and clarified in Booker v. Duke Medical Center,37 the
North Carolina Supreme Court finally recognized byssinosis as an occupa-
tional disease.38
The Booker court determined that the occupational exposure need not be
the sole originating cause of a worker's disease for that disease to be compen-
sable.39 But the issue of how much compensation would be allowed when a
worker's diseases were caused by both occupational and nonoccupational fac-
tors was not squarely addressed by the supreme court until Morrison v. Bur-
lington Industries.40 Despite finding that plaintiff was permanently and totally
disabled, the court in Morrison awarded compensation for only permanent
partial disability because only part of plaintiff's disability had been caused by
occupational factors.41 The court ruled that the Industrial Commission was
correct in apportioning Morrison's recovery according to the percentage of her
disability caused, aggravated, or accelerated solely by occupational factors.42
The Morrison court failed to identify clearly the occupational disease
before it. Although plaintiff's claim sought compensation for "an occupa-
tional disease-to wit, byssinosis," 43 the Commission and the court followed
the lead of the medical experts, consistently referring to her incapacity to work
as being caused by "chronic obstructive lung disease due in part to cotton dust
exposure." 44 It is uncertain whether the court intended this phrase to mean
byssinosis, an occupational disease which was to be fully compensated because
it constituted that portion of plaintiff's chronic obstructive lung disease caused
by her occupational exposure, or whether the court recognized chronic ob-
structive lung disease as a separate occupational disease, which would be com-
35. Id. § 97-53(13).
36. See Note, Redfnition of Occupational Disease and the Applicable Compensation Statute-
Booker v. Duke Medical Center and Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 288,
289 (1980).
37. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
38. Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979) (error for lower court to
take judicial notice that byssinosis was not a compensable occupational disease).
39. Booker, 297 N.C. at 473, 256 S.E.2d at 199.
40. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981). A student commentator stated that the issue of appor-
tionment was "[plerhaps the most significant issue presented to the [North Carolina] courts in
1981." Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981-dministrative Law, 60 N.C.L. REv.
1164, 1194-95 (1982).
41. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 6-7, 282 S.E.2d at 463.
42. Id. at 13, 282 S.E.2d at 467. Apportionment was permitted even though a similar rule
had been rejected for accident claims. See Little v. Anson County Schools Food Serv., 295 N.C.
527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978). While admitting to forming a dichotomy, the Morrison court felt that
extending accident law to diseases was a legislative function. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 19,282 S.E.2d
at 470. This conclusion was criticized in Note, (4595 o) my Breath, supra note 13, at 123.
43. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 2, 282 S.E.2d at 461.
44. E.g., id at 8, 282 S.E.2d at 464.
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pensated only partially according to the disease's work related components. 45
This ambiguity surrounding the phrase "chronic obstructive lung disease"
later would provide the loophole through which the Rutledge majority would
reconcile its opinion with Morrison.
In a lengthy dissent to the Morrison opinion, Justice Exum stated that
neither precedent nor the facts supported the majority's position. In Exum's
view, no apportionment was necessary because Morrison's chronic obstructive
lung disease-an occupational disease in its own right-was completely re-
sponsible for her disability,47 and because her cotton dust exposure had "sig-
nificantly contributed" to that ultimate disease.48
In Hansel v. Sherman Textiles,49 decided the same day as Morrison, the
supreme court recognized byssinosis as an occupational disease,50 but refused
to allow recovery of full benefits because part of plaintiffs disability was at-
tributable to asthma and chronic bronchitis, which were not occupational in
origin.5t The majority, relying heavily on Morrison, remanded the case to the
Industrial Commission for determination of the relative contributions of occu-
pational and nonoccupational factors to Hansel's disability.52 In a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Exum reiterated his "significant contribution to
the ultimate disease" standard53 and noted the problems inherent in the In-
dustrial Commission's attempt to scientifically assign percentages to causes of
lung disease that are medically indistinguishable when in the chronic stages.54
The commentators' reactions to the majority opinions in Morrison and
Hansel were almost unanimously negative.55 Despite the critics' opposition to
the apportionment rule and the lower court's difficulty in applying it,56 the
rule continued to be binding. The most recent pre-Rutledge opinion of the
45. The "components" of chronic obstructive lung disease include pulmonary emphysema,
chronic bronchitis, and possibly asthma, as well as byssinosis. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 92, 301
S.E.2d at 364.
46. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 24-34, 282 S.E.2d at 473-79 (Exum, J., dissenting). For a pre-
Morrison review of North Carolina law supporting Exum's conclusions, see Note, supra note 4.
47. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 19, 282 S.E.2d at 470-71 (Exum, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 44, 282 S.E.2d at 484 (Exum, J., dissenting). The significant contribution test had
been previously suggested in Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 916, 932 (1980).
49. 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).
50. Id. at 48, 283 S.E.2d at 103.
51. Id. at 53, 283 S.E.2d at 106.
52. Id. at 58-59, 283 S.E.2d at 109.
53. Id. at 64, 283 S.E.2d at 112 (Exum, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 66, 283 S.E.2d at 113 n.8 (Exum, J., concurring).
55. See, e.g., A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 41.64(c), at 7-436 n.87 (Supp. 1983) ("remarkable"
that Morrison court apportioned without an express apportionment statute); Note, (45% oj] my
Breath, supra note 13, at 125 (Morrison departs from precedent, creates an artificial distinction
between accident and disease claims, and usurps legislature's function). For a somewhat more
favorable critique, see Note, Apportionment, supra note 13, at 820 (Morrison rule consistent with
purposes of Workers' Compensation Act, although a departure from precedent).
56. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Waverly Mills, 56 N.C. App. 14, 286 S.E.2d 837 (1982) (Morrison does
not require remand for apportionment when expert unable to assign percentages to relative contri-
butions); Anderson v. Smyre Mfg. Co., 54 N.C. App. 337, 283 S.E.2d 433 (1981) (no apportion-
ment required despite clear history of smoking). See also Note, Apportionment, supra note 13, at
809 (courts often simply defer to the Commission's evaluation of testimony).
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North Carolina Supreme Court on the cotton dust issue was Walston v. Bur-
lington Industries.57 The pulmonary expert in Walston diagnosed the plaintiff
as having "possible" byssinosis that "could possibly" have played a role in
causation but which was more likely to have played a contributory role. 58 The
court affirmed the Industrial Commission's finding that Walston did not have
an occupational disease.5 9
Finally writing for the majority, Justice Exum in Rutledge avoided the
apportionment rule by distinguishing Morrison and Hansel, despite Rutledge's
own argument in her court of appeals brief to the effect that Rutledge and
Morrison had "very similar facts."'60 Stating that the commission and court in
Morrison and Hansel had found the claimants' occupational diseases to be
byssinosis rather than chronic obstructive lung disease,61 Exum characterized
Rutledge as a case of first impression: "[the] question now clearly before us
for the first time is whether a textile worker's chronic obstructive lung disease
may be an occupational disease .... *62 The Rutledge majority answered this
question affirmatively, holding that a disease may be occupational if the
worker's exposure has contributed significantly to it.6 3 The court then re-
manded the case to the Industrial Commission to determine whether Rut-
ledge's years of textile labor had contributed significantly to her chronic
obstructive lung disease, and instructed the Commission that apportionment
would be unnecessary if the significant contribution standard were satisfied. 64
The court distinguished Walston on the ground that Rutledge's cotton dust
exposure was a "probable," rather than "possible," cause of her disease.65
Justice Meyer, joined by two others in dissent,66 persuasively argued that
the majority's attempts to avoid Morrison, Hansel, and Walston "subtly but
effectively" overruled them.67 The dissenters believed that chronic obstructive
lung disease was "not a specific disease in and of itself' '68 and should not have
been classified as an occupational disease. They argued that if the Rulledge
court had examined the plaintiffs specific lung diseases-as previous courts
57. 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1981), amended on reh'g, 305 N.C. 296, 285 S.E.2d 822
(1982).
58. Id. at 672, 285 S.E.2d at 824.
59. Justices Exum and Carlton concurred separately without opinion, apparently satisfied
that Exum's significant contribution threshold had not been crossed.
60. Plaintifi's Court of Appeals Brief at 7, Rutledge, 56 N.C. App. 345, 289 S.E.2d 72 (1982).
At the time of plaintifi's statement the North Carolina Supreme Court had not yet reversed the
court of appeals decision in Morrison, which supported Rutledge's claim.
61. Rudedge, 308 N.C. at 100, 301 S.E.2d at 369. Justice Exum previously had reached the
opposite conclusion about the Morrison majority's holding. In Hansel Exum stated in his concur-
ring opinion that "although Morrison claimed benefits for. . . byssinosis . ., this Court identi-
fied her occupational disease as chronic obstructive lung disease." Hansel, 304 N.C. at 61, 283
S.E.2d at 110 (Exum, J., concurring).
62. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 100-01, 301 S.E.2d at 369.
63. Id. at 101-02, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
64. Id. at 107, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
65. Id. at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
66. Meyer was joined by Chief Justice Branch and Justice Copeland. All three had been in
the Morrison, Hansel, and Walston majorities.
67. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 109, 301 S.E.2d at 374 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 121, 301 S.E.2d at 381 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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had done-the majority would have found that occupational exposure had
contributed to some of Rutledge's diseases (e.g., byssinosis) and not to others
(e.g., emphysema). 69 By lumping all of Rutledge's specific lung diseases under
one generic term (chronic obstructive lung disease) and permitting the generic
term to qualify as an occupational disease, the majority necessarily reached
the conclusion that plaintiffs occupational exposure had contributed to her
disabling disease-if it had contributed to a component, it had contributed to
the whole. The dissenters called this analysis a "word trick,"70 arguing that
Rutledge was not distinguished from its predecessors by a difference in facts
but rather by what the majority had chosen to label the occupational disease.
Although Rutledge's departure from the precedent established by Morri-
son and Hansel can be explained by the change in the membership of the
North Carolina Supreme Court,71 that explanation adds little to an under-
standing of the law. By distinguishing Morrison and Hansel without overrul-
ing them, the Rutledge majority intimated that apportionment may still be
appropriate in some cases. The critical question remaining after Rutledge is:
under what circumstances is apportionment still required? Rutledge "in effect
overruled Morrison's apportionment rule in any case in which it is found that
the [plaintiffs] disability was entirely caused by chronic obstructive lung dis-
ease."72 It may be argued, however, that apportionment still is required if the
worker's disability is not caused entirely by chronic obstructive lung disease,
or if his occupational disease is identified as byssinosis rather than chronic
obstructive lung disease.
The Rutledge majority conceded in dicta that apportionment would be
permissible if nonoccupational, nonpulmonary ailments "contributed inde-
pendently" to a plaintiff's incapacity to work.73 The court did not provide any
examples of such "independent contributing factors," or explain how the In-
dustrial Commission might recognize them. Some clues to the meaning of the
term may be gleaned, however, from the Morrison court's majority and dis-
senting opinions. In Morrison plaintiffs lung difficulties prompted her em-
ployer to transfer her to a dust-free environment where she was required to
stand while working. Because of her preexisting phlebitis, Morrison was un-
able to work standing up, and thus was totally disabled from working in any
part of the textile plant.74 The Morrison majority identified phlebitis, varicose
veins, and diabetes as independent contributing factors, requiring apportion-
69. Id. at 125, 301 S.E.2d at 383 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Emphysema was noted specifically
as being scientifically incapable of occupational causation, aggravation, or acceleration.
70. Id. They also disagreed with the majority's characterization of Walston as a "possible
cause" case and Rutledge as a "probable cause" case, calling it a "distinction without a differ-
ence." Id. at 128, 301 S.E.2d at 385 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
71. Justices Huskins and Britt, both of whom had been in the 5-2 majorities of Morrison,
Hansel, and Walston, were replaced by Justices Mitchell and Martin in 1982. Justice Carlton,
who had joined in the previous Exum opinions, was replaced by Justice Frye in 1983. All three
new justices joined Exum in his majority opinion in Rutledge. It is possible that Exum did not
expressly overrule Morrison in order to retain the majority needed to defeat apportionment.
72. A. LARsON, supra note 3, § 41.64(c), at 7-436 n.87 (Supp. 1983).
73. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 374.
74. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 7 n.2, 282 S.E.2d at 464 n.2 (Finding of Fact 6).
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ment because they had contributed to her disability without having been
caused, aggravated, or accelerated by her employment.75 The Morrison dis-
senters, in an opinion written by Justice Exum, argued that plaintiff's phlebitis
was not an independent contributing factor and should not be apportioned
out. They maintained that the phlebitis could not have contributed indepen-
dently to plaintiffs disability because that disease alone had never kept her
from working,76 and asserted that Morrison's lung disease was entirely respon-
sible for her disability.7 7
The Rutledge majority opinion, also written by Exum, did not adopt ex-
pressly the MAorrison dissent's description of independent contributing factors,
but did employ implicitly the same standard. By construing the Industrial
Commission's findings to mean that Rutledge's disability was due "entirely" to
her pulmonary disease,78 and by excluding plaintiff's significant nonpulmo-
nary factors from the scope of the Commission's consideration of the case on
remand,79 the Rutledge majority in effect used the independent contribution
standard described in the Morrison dissent, and ignored the standard appear-
ing in the Morrison majority opinion.
If the North Carolina Supreme Court expressly adopts the Morrison dis-
senters' independent contribution standard in some future case, that decision
will have far-reaching consequences. The new standard may be expected to
shift the burden of proof to the employer, forcing him to prove independent
causation (actual loss of work due to the independent source) rather than
merely contribution.80 Strict adherence to the independent contribution stan-
dard would restrict severely apportionment of benefits due to nonoccupational
ailments, and might prevent apportionment altogether in multiple pulmonary
disease cases 81 even if a scientifically accurate test were developed that could
differentiate occupational and nonoccupational lung diseases. 82
An interesting question is raised when one considers whether, after Rut-
ledge, apportionment still is required when the Industrial Commission de-
clares a plaintiffs occupational disese to be byssinosis rather than chronic
obstructive lung disease. Because Rutledge did not overrule Morrison and
Hansel, one must assume that other components of chronic obstructive lung
disease, such as chronic bronchitis and pulmonary emphysema, nonoccupa-
tional in their origin, would be apportioned out as separate diseases unless
75. Id. at 5, 282 S.E.2d at 462. There is some ambiguity about whether the court actually
factored out the non-lung-related causes. See id. at 21-22, 282 S.E.2d at 471-73 (Exum, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id. at 19, 282 S.E.2d at 470 (Exum, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 19, 282 S.E.2d at 470-71 (Exum, J., dissenting).
78. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 374. The Commission did not use the word
"entirely," but simply stated that plaintiff was disabled "because of her pulmonary impairment."
Record on Appeal at 3.
79. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 108-09, 301 S.E.2d at 374.
80. See id at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
81. ThefRutledge majority opinion suggests that apportionment is permissible only when the
independent contributing factors are nonpulmonary diseases. Id at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 374.
82. See, e.g., A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 41.64(b), at 7-430 (Dr. Selikoff's 1972 medical
breakthrough enabled doctors to distinguish between cancer and asbestosis).
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they had been aggravated or accelerated by the plaintiffs occupational expo-
sure. Rather than affirming that the Industrial Commission could have found
that chronic obstructive lung disease was occupational, as it did in Rutledge,
the court, to prevent apportionment in such a case, would have to rule that the
Commission must find chronic obstructive lung disease to be the occupational
disease and byssinosis merely one of its components, rather than a separate
disease. Such a decision would mandate that much of Morrison and Hansel be
overruled explicitly.
The court already may be headed in that direction. In Dowdy v. Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc.,83 handed down after Rutledge, the court determined that for stat-
ute of limitations purposes, plaintiff had been disabled by an occupational dis-
ease (chronic obstructive lung disease) in 1973,84 although he was not
informed of his occupational disease (byssinosis) until 1974.85 In rejecting
plaintiffs argument that he had been informed of a different occupational dis-
ease than he had contracted, which prevented the start of the statute of limita-
tions period, the court said:
[W]e think it unimportant here to determine whether byssinosis is a
particular type of chronic obstructive lung disease or a separate dis-
ease often found in conjunction with or evolving from chronic ob-
structive lung disease. For purposes of awarding workers'
compensation benefits, there is no practical difference between
chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis. .... 86
The Dowdy dicta seems to retreat from the sharp distinction between the two
diseases that enabled Rutledge's majority to reject apportionment without ex-
pressly overruling Morrison. The language provides future courts with a basis
for reading chronic obstructive lung disease into a future commission finding
of byssinosis in order to prevent apportionment.8 7
Rutledge appears to return North Carolina to the nonapportionment rule
espoused in pre-Morrison North Carolina decisions s and in the majority of
83. 308 N.C. 701, 304 S.E.2d 215 (1983).
84. Id. at 708, 304 S.E.2d at 220. The court stated that Dowdy's occupational disease was
chronic obstructive lung disease, despite the fact that big claim was filed for byssinosis and the
Industrial Commission had referred to his occupational disease as byssinosis. Dowdy v. Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc., 59 N.C. App. 696, 697, 298 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1982), rev'don other grounds, 308 N.C. 701,
304 S.E.2d 215 (1983).
85. Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 711-12, 304 S.E.2d at 221. In a separate concurring opinion, the
Rutledge dissenters argued that it was unnecessary for the Dowdy majority to decide that chronic
obstructive lung disease, diagnosed in 1973, was the plaintiffs occupational disease. Because
Dowdy was informed of his byssinosis in 1974, and because the statute of limitations would have
barred a cause of action arising in 1973 or 1974, there was "absolutely no reason to select the date
of 1973 except to fortify the language of Rutledge . Id. at 717, 304 S.E.2d at 224 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
86. Id. at 712, 304 S.E.2d at 222.
87. It was unnecessary for Dowdy to explicitly overrule Morrison. Because Dowdy's claim
was barred, no apportionment was possible.
88. See, e.g., Little v. Anson County Schools Food Serv., 295 N.C. 527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978)
(no apportionment when industrial accident combines with nonoccupational infirmities, such as
age and education, to cause disability); Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp., 15 N.C. App. 253,
189 S.E.2d 804 (1972) (no apportionment when the 40% disability caused by silicosis combined
with nonoccupational factors to cause total disability); Self v. Starr-Davis Co., 13 N.C. App. 694,
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other jurisdictions.8 9 Generally, compensation is not determined by examin-
ing the relative contributions of multiple lung diseases "except in states having
special statutes on aggravation of disease."90 The controversy surrounding
Rutledge led to an attempt to enact just such a special statute in North Caro-
lina. Claiming that economic hardship would result from the Rutledge deci-
sion,9 1 textile manufacturers sought legislative relief.92 A bill was introduced
in the senate and sent to committee,93 where hearings were held but no action
was taken.94
Rutledge's rule requiring full compensation whenever a plaintiff's em-
ployment has contributed significantly to his occupational disease is a fairer
approach to workers' compensation than Morrison's apportionment rule. The
difficulties in administering a rule of legal liability based on a scientifically
inaccurate standard of apportionment, together with the compromises inher-
ent in the workers' compensation system, would seem to call for a rule of lib-
eral construction of the occupational disease statutes. 95 Rutledge's rule of full
187 S.E.2d 466 (1971) (no apportionment when asbestosis accelerates and contributes to death by
brain tumor). See generally Note, (459o o]) My Breath, supra note 13, at 115 (prior to Morrison,
North Carolina appellate courts consistently rejected apportionment unless the apportionment
statute specifically applied).
89. See Note, (45%o o/) My Breath,supra note 13, at 122-24. North Carolina may be the only
state to judicially apportion pathology. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 20 (statement of Charles E.
Hassell, attorney for plaintiff inMorrison). The concept of apportionment was expressly rejected
in the landmark case of Pullman Kellog v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 26 Cal. 3d 450,
605 P.2d 422, 161 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1980). See also Rudedge, 308 N.C. at 104, 301 S.E.2d at 371
(citing cases from other jurisdictions rejecting apportionment).
90. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.22, at 10-365. See also Note, (45%0 o/) My Breath, supra
note 13, at 123-24 (North Carolina legislature's failure to amend the Workers' Compensation Act
to provide for apportionment in occupational disease cases after the Mabe decision indicates that
the legislature intended to prevent apportionment).
91. See Raleigh News and Observer, May 8, 1983, at 8A, col. 4. (executive director of N.C.
Textile Mfrs. Ass'n. estimates Rutledge decision could cost industry up to $200 million). These
costs are now being borne by the textile workers or by another compensation system. See, e.g.,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REP., October 15, 1981, at 388 (study showing that 95% of
byssinotics receive Social Security payments; only 5% receive workers' compensation awards).
As an alternative to seeking legislative relief from the Rutledge holding, textile manufacturers
could minimize the financial impact of Rutledge by refusing to hire smokers. See A. LARSON,
supra note 3, § 41.64(c), at 7-432 n.83.1 (employment discrimination against smokers is legal and
has been implemented by Johns-Manville). Adoption of such a policy now, however, would not
reduce their retroactive liability. Long-term liability also will be reduced by recently enacted
strict OSHA standards. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1982); see also 4A R. GRAY, A-roRiNEY's
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 205E-6 (3d ed. 1983). Nonetheless, their enactment without regard to
cost-benefit analysis-upheld in American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)-
no doubt will increase the employers' costs in the short run.
92. Retired North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Huskins, author of the Morrison and Mal-
ston opinions, was hired to draft a bill to nullify Rutledge and mandate apportionment. Raleigh
News and Observer, May 5, 1983, at IA, col. 4. Huskins' bill received local press attention and
prompted a crowd of byssinosis victims to demonstrate their opposition by marching inside the
state legislature building, forcing the legislators to take a personal look at the victims' extensive
disabilities. Id., May 19, 1983, at IC, cols. 2-3.
93. See N.C. Sen. Bill 471 (1983). The bill as introduced did not achieve its stated purpose.
The occupational disease provision merely reiterated the language of Morrison, enabling it to
again be circumvented by naming chronic obstructive lung disease as the occupational disease.
Moreover, the bill went beyondRutledge, extending the doctrine to nontextile workers and requir-
ing apportionment of industrial accident cases as well. Id.
94. Raleigh News and Observer, May 19, 1983, at IC, col. 3.
95. See Edes, Compensationfor Occupational Diseases, 31 (10) LAB. L.J. 595, 599 (1980);
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compensation obtained through such liberal construction does not threaten to
turn the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act into "general accident
and health insurance," as the dissenters feared, for it is tempered by the re-
quirement that the plaintiff prove that his employment exposure signiftcantly
contributed to his disability. That Justice Exum concurred in the Walston de-
cision denying plaintiffs occupational disease claim implies that not every
case will meet this significant contribution test, making Rutledge truly a
"balance." 96
Although Rutledge seems to return North Carolina to the majority and
better view of occupational disease compensation, the court's hesitancy to ex-
pressly overrule Morrison leaves the law in a state of confusion at a time when
clarity is sorely needed.97 At its earliest opportunity, the court should clarify
the distinction, if any, between byssinosis and chronic obstructive lung disease
for apportionment purposes, admitting the court's significant legal and philo-
sophical differences with Morrison and Hansel.98
GREGORY STUART SMITH
Note, supra note 48, at 925 (occupationally diseased workers do not receive equitable trade-off
when they relinquish right to sue employers).
96. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 105, 301 S.E.2d at 371. A Commission finding of probable employ-
ment contribution should lead to full recovery, while one of merely "possible" contribution would
preclude any recovery.
See Swink v. Cone Mills, Inc., - N.C. App. -, 309 S.E.2d 271 (1983) (reversing on rehearing
the pre-Rutledge decision in Swink v. Cone Mills, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 475, 300 S.E.2d 848 (1983)).
The earlier Swink case had upheld an Industrial Commission denial of benefits to a worker who
had been exposed to cotton dust for 38 years but who also had a history of smoking and tuberculo-
sis. The court of appeals in the second case remanded the case to the Commission on the question
of causation, correctly noting that a "mere possibility" of industrial aggravation, held insufficient
to support plaintiffs claim in Walston, would not meet the Rutledge "significant contribution"
test. Id. at -, 309 S.E.2d at 272.
97. The number of byssinosis-type claims has mushroomed in recent years. See Ellis, supra
note 2, at 18 (913 filed in N.C. in 1970s, 684 in 1980 alone; up to 50% of these claims disputed).
98. Sufficient justification exists for overruling Morrison outright. As noted by the commen-
tators, Morrison was a "strained and self-serving interpretation of precedent," Note, Apportion-
ment,supra note 13, at 820, and could be overruled as an aberration in order to "reestablish North
Carolina's progressive tradition in the field of workers' compensation law," Note, (45% o]) my
Breath,supra note 13, at 125. Perhaps more palatable would be to overrule Morrison on the basis
of medical experts' refusals to assign percentages to the relative contributions of chronic lung
diseases. These practical difficulties, the extent of which perhaps was not recognized fully by the
Morrison court, could constitute changed circumstances--even since 198 1-justifying Morrison's
demise.
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Tort Immunity--Briscoe v. LaHue: Abandonment of the
Balancing Approach in Immunity Cases Under Section
1983
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides a federal tort remedy for
any person whose constitutional rights are violated by a person or agency act-
ing "under color of" state law.' Since its inception in 1871, federal courts
have struggled to develop an approach to reconcile the conflicting policies un-
derlying section 1983 and common-law principles of tort immunity. The courts
must consider two competing interests: the individual's right to a remedy
under section 1983 and the public's interest in protecting those involved in the
judicial process, as well as certain other public officials, from fear and harass-
ment that might impair the performance of their duties.2 Read literally, the
statute "admits of no immunities."'3 Nevertheless, in several cases the
Supreme Court has recognized immunity defenses that have severely restricted
remedies for individuals under section 1983. 4 In the past, the Court deter-
mined whether to extend immunity to a new class of potential defendants by
balancing the interests underlying both the immunity defense and the section
1983 remedy.5 The analysis of competing interests determined not only
whether immunity was available, but also whether the immunity was quali-
fied 6 or absolute. 7 In a recent decision, however, the Court brought the con-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Section 1983 originally was enacted in response to violations of constitutional rights perpetrated
by the Ku Klux Klan and ignored by state officials. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
2. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 57, 272 n.45 (1978); see also Vee-
der, Absolute Immunity in Defamatior Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 463 (1909) (con-
flict between immunity and the individual's right to a tort remedy for defamation).
3. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). Congress can change a common law doc-
trine by statute. For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970 & Supp. V
1975) defines immunity as it applies to the cause of action created. See Note, Delimiting the Scope
of Prosecutorial Immunity From Section 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 173, 178 n.41
(1977).
4. While immunity protects the public's interest in the effectiveness of the judicial process, it
necessarily cuts off claims that might have merit. Immunity "negatefs]pro tanto the very remedy
which it appears Congress sought to create." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (1976)
(White, J. concurring).
5. See infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
6. Qualified immunity protects the defendant from liability for acts committed without mal-
ice and for good cause. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF Tim LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 776-77 (1971);
see Veeder, supra note 2, at 464.
7. Absolute immunity protects the defendant from liability regardless of the defendant's
motives or reasonableness of behavior. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 114, at 776-77; see Veeder,
supra note 2, at 464.
The Court has extended absolute immunity to defendants who perform functions closely as-
sociated with the judicial process. See infra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.
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tinuing validity of this balancing approach into question by adopting a strict
functional test.8
In Briscoe v. LaHue9 the Court faced the question whether police officers
acting as witnesses should be treated as witnesses entitled to absolute immu-
nity, or as police officers entitled only to qualified immunity.10 In deciding to
extend absolute immunity to policemen who function as witnesses, the Court
expressly refused to consider policy arguments that might have justified excep-
tions for certain classes of witnesses."I Although Briscoe may be criticized for
the analysis of legislative intent underlying section 1983,12 the failure to deal
with the problem of police perjury,13 and the creation of confusion concerning
immunity analysis in section 1983 cases,14 the decision supports two important
policies: (1) full disclosure of the truth in judicial proceedings 15 and (2) pre-
vention of frivolous lawsuits. 16
The controversy in Briscoe arose out of two separate criminal trials that
resulted in three convictions. Carlisle W. Briscoe was convicted of burglary in
state court after Martin LaHue, a policeman, testified that in his opinion a
fingerprint found at the scene of the crime could be matched with Briscoe's. 17
Chris P. Vickers, Jr. and James N. Ballard were jointly convicted of sexual
assault in another state court after James W. Hunley, also a policeman, testi-
fied that the defendants had coordinated their stories before making similar
exculpatory statements to the police.' 8 Vickers, with Ballard, and Briscoe filed
section 1983 complaints, alleging that the police witnesses who had testified
against them had violated their constitutional rights by committing perjury. 19
8. Under the functional approach, functions protected at common law have the same pro-
tection in section 1983 cases, despite the competing interests involved. See infra notes 129-30 and
accompanying text.
The Court has emphasized the defendant's function in past cases, but in those cases it also
balanced the competing policies involved. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978); Im-
bier v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428 (1976).
9. 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983).
10. Id. at 1119.
11. The Court was concerned that once police witnesses were excepted from the rule of abso-
lute immunity, other classes of government officials acting as witnesses would have to be consid-
ered: "The contours of the proposed exception are not clear. Similar considerations would
presumably apply to other government officials and experts, including coroners, medical examin-
ers, psychiatric experts, and social workers." Id. at 1119 n.27.
12. See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
17. LaHue, an Indiana policeman, stated that "a latent three-point fingerprint he discovered
at the scene of the crime could be linked to Briscoe." Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 715 (3d Cir.
1981), aft'd, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983). Briscoe alleged that LaHue had seen an F.B.I. analysis indicat-
ing that the fingerprint was worthless. Id.
18. It was alleged that Hunley testified falsely that the two men had been together after their
arrest and before giving similar statements. Id. at 717.
19. Briscoe alleged that his federal constitutional right to due process had been violated by
LaHue's false testimony. Id. at 715. Vickers and Ballard alleged that Hunley had violated their
federal constitutional rights to due process and to trial by an impartial jury when he testified
falsely against them. Id. at 717.
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Both complaints were dismissed in district court.20 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in a single opinion that
police officers, as well as all other witnesses, had absolute immunity from lia-
bility under section 1983.21
On certiorari, the Supreme Court considered the issue whether a person
convicted of a criminal offense could seek damages under section 1983 against
a police witness who committed pejury.2 2 In affirming the appellate court's
decision the Supreme Court began with the assumption that if Congress had
intended to abolish rules existing at common law, it would have made this
intention clear in either the language or legislative history of the statute.
23
Consequently, the Court's analysis addressed the following questions: (1)
whether the common law granted absolute immunity in this situation, 24 (2)
whether Congress intended to change common-law principles of immunity,25
and (3) whether the Court should create an exception to common-law rules.26
The Court found that the common law granted absolute immunity both
to witnesses and to officials performing critical roles in the judicial process. 27
Either of these categories could include police officers acting as witnesses. 28
After determining the relevant common-law principle, the Court found no
manifestation of legislative intent to abolish the absolute immunity defense.
29
The Court also rejected arguments that the rationale underlying witness im-
munity applied with less force to police witnesses. 30 The Court refused to eval-
uate the conflicting policies underlying section 1983 and witness immunity,
20. Id. at 717. A motion for summary judgment for LaHue was granted because: (1) the
complaint did not allege facts to support a finding of perjury; (2) allegations of perjury do not
support a constitutional claim; (3) LaHue's testimony had not been "under color of state law"; and
(4) Briscoe's claim was blocked by collateral estoppel due to his conviction. Id. at 715-16.
Hunley's motion to dismiss the complaint against him was granted by a federal magistrate
because: (1) Hunley's testimony had not been "under color of state law"; (2) as a witness, Hunley
was absolutely immune from liability; and (3) the complaint did not allege knowing use of false
testimony. Id. at 717.
21. Id. at 721.
22. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1111.
23. Id. at 1113. "One important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is
that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses
previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law
principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary." Id. (quoting City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981)).
24. Id. at 1112-16.
25. Id. at 1116-18.
26. Id. at 1119-21.
27. The Court referred to "judges, prosecutors, and other persons acting 'under color of law'
who perform official functions in the judicial process." Id. at 1115.
28. Id. at 1115-16.
29. Id. at 1116-18.
30. These arguments were:
Policemen often have a duty to testify about the products of their investigations, and
they have a professional interest in obtaining convictions which would assertedly coun-
terbalance any tendency to shade testimony in favor of potentially vindictive defendants.
In addition, they are subject to § 1983 lawsuits for the performance of their duties, as to
which they have only qualified immunity, and their defense is generally undertaken by
their governmental employers.
Id. at 1119.
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but stressed a functional approach instead; "our cases clearly indicate that im-
munity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the
defendant." 31
'Justice Marshall's dissent sharply criticized the majority's construction of
the statute.32 Marshall initially contended that the Act's failure to specify any
immunity defense indicated the intent of Congress to abrogate common law
principles of immunity.33 He found further support for his interpretation in
the legislative history.34 Regardless of legislative intent, however, Marshall
believed the applicable standard at common law was one of qualified immu-
nity.35 He concluded that the policies served by witness immunity do not jus-
tify absolute immunity for police witnesses. 36
Understanding the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Briscoe re-
quires an understanding of the common law of immunity, the events leading
to the enactment of section 1983, and the Supreme Court decisions preceding
Briscoe. Tort immunity for participants in judicial proceedings appeared as
early as the fourteenth century.37 In the early English courts, defamation ac-
tions were initiated by civil and criminal defendants against individuals in-
volved in the judicial process. 38 Because of concern that "those who have just
cause for complaint, would not dare to complain for fear of infinite vexa-
tion,"'39 immunity was granted to plaintiffs in civil suits. Similarly, immunity
from tort liability allowed witnesses to speak freely40 and judges to decide
fairly,4 ' without fear that the losing party would retaliate with a lawsuit. An-
other target for tort claims was the jury, whose members were granted immu-
nity from conspiracy claims for conduct during the course of a trial.42 The
31. Id. The term "status" referred to defendant's official position. Plaintiff's contention had
been that witnesses with the "status" of police officer should not be entitled to absolute immunity.
Id. at 1119.
32. Id. at 1121-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1126-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
35. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1123-26 (Marshall, ., dissenting).
36. Marshall argued that the expertise and official status of a police officer created potential
for manipulation ofjudicial proceedings that was likely to go unrestrained in the absence of a civil
remedy. He felt that perjury is particularly harmful because a police officer has more credibility
with the jury than an ordinary witness. Furthermore, a police witness is less likely to be inhibited
by fear of subsequent liability because testifying is a normal duty of a policeman and defense
against charges based on official conduct would be provided by government counsel. A further
consideration was that despite widespread police perjury, prosecutors do not often bring charges
against police officers. Marshall believed that these factors opposing absolute immunity clearly
outweighed the purposes of absolute immunity: to encourage full disclosure and to conserve judi-
cial resources. He concluded that police witnesses were entitled to no more than qualified immu-
nity. Id. at 1131-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 534 (1868) (citing Book of Assizes, 27 Edw. III
pl. 18 (1354)).
38. This does not imply that immunity applied only to defamation actions. Rather, most of
the common law cases involved defamation claims because of the limited remedies available to
defendants.
39. Cutter v. Dixon, 76 Eng. Rep. 886, 888 (K.B. 1585).
40. Henderson v. Broomhead, 157 Eng. Rep. 964, 967 (Ex. 1859).
41. Floyd and Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306 (K.B. 1607).
42. Id. The Court in Floyd, however, stated that a conspiracy taking place outside the court
for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the proceedings would not be protected. This find-
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rationale underlying these decisions was that those closely involved in judicial
proceedings could perform their functions properly only if they did not have
to fear retaliatory litigation.43 Consequently, the general rule was that "ac-
tions will not lie for ... words spoken in the course of litigation which are
relevant to that litigation." 44
The common-law courts adhered to the standard of absolute immunity,
which protects a defendant from liability regardless of motives or reasonable-
ness of behavior.45 Qualified immunity, on the other hand, protects a defend-
ant from liability only for acts committed without malice and for good
cause.46 Qualified immunity was discussed in early English cases but never
adopted.47 In the United States the concept of qualified immunity was first
treated by the Supreme Court in White v. Nicholls.48 In dictum the Court
stated that "the privilege should. . . be taken with strong and well defined
qualifications, '49 specifically, express malice.50 In Randall v. Brigham51 the
Supreme Court appeared to adopt a standard of qualified immunity for
judges.52 Three years later, however, the Court held in Bradley v. Fisher53 that
ing was a very early indication that the immunity rule would favor functions "intimately associ-
ated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430
(1976), but not those outside the judicial process.
43. The adversarial nature of the judicial process is likely to arouse hard feelings. Conse-
quently, an unsuccessful litigant might vent his anger through lawsuits against other participants
in the proceedings. This rationale was articulated in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 348
(1871):
Controversies involving not merely great pecuniary interests, but the liberty and charac-
ter of the parties, and consequently exciting the deepest feelings, are being constantly
determined in those courts, in which there is great conflict in the evidence and great
doubt as to the law which should govern their decision. . . . It is in this class of cases
that the losing party feels most keenly the decision against him, and most readily accepts
anything but the soundness of the decision in explanation of the action of the judge.
A secondary rationale was finality to litigation: "If the judicial matters of record should be
drawn into question. . . there never will be an end of causes: but controversies will be infinite,"
Floyd and Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306 (K.B. 1607).
In England, a further rationale supporting immunity for judges was that judges derived their
power from the king, whose judgment was unquestionable; therefore, a judge's actions in court
could be questioned only by the king himself. Id. at 1307.
44. Henderson v. Broomhead, 157 Eng. Rep. 964, 967 (Ex. 1859).
45. See supra note 7.
46. See supra note 6.
47. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Scarlett 106 Eng. Rep. 86 (K.B. 1818). In an action for slander
against an attorney for words spoken at trial, the court stated that there could be no action for
slander "unless actual malice be proved." Id. at 87. Since no actual malice was alleged, the court
went on to say: "Here however it is not very material to consider the limits of such privilege; for
the defendant is clearly within them." Id.
That absolute immunity might not be the fairest rule was suggested in Henderson v. Broom-
head, 157 Eng. Rep. 964, 968 (Ex. 1859): "In spite of all that can be said against it, we find the
rule acted upon from the earliest times."
48. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
49. Id. at 287.
50. Id. at 288. For its qualifying language, however, the Court relied on dicta in a common-
law decision. d. (citing Hodgson v. Scarlett, 106 Eng. Rep. 86 (K.B. 1818)). Express malice is
malice proven directly, rather than inferred.
51. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
52. The Court implied that it would not grant immunity "where the acts.., are done mali-
ciously or corruptly." Id. at 536.
53. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
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judges were absolutely immune from liability.5 4
While the Supreme Court was struggling with standards of immunity to
protect the fact-finding process, 55 Congress was faced with another problem:
how to guarantee the rights of the freed slaves following the Civil War. Sec-
tion one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (hereafter section 1983)56 was one of a
series of actions taken by Congress to protect these rights.57 The state govern-
ments had failed to deal adequately with Ku Klux Klan activities that violated
the constitutional rights recently accorded to blacks. 58 Although state laws
were ostensibly designed to prevent such activities, state officials were either
unable or unwilling to enforce them. 59 The only way to protect the citizens of
the states from the Ku Klux Klan was to ensure that state officials performed
their duties properly. Thus, Congress saw the need for a remedy against state
officials who denied blacks and Union sympathizers equal protection of state
54. "[Tihis exemption of the judges from civil liability [cannot] be affected by the motives
with which their judicial acts are performed." Id. at 347. The Court explained that its qualifying
comments inRandall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868), were not meant to imply that qualified immu-
nity was the proper standard, but to avoid a lengthy explanation of apparently conflicting deci-
sions in cases at common law. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351.
This explanation, however, came after the enactment of what was later codified as section
1983, so it is likely that if Congress had considered the issue at all, it would have concluded that
qualified immunity was the standard. See infra note 119.
55. By protecting those who performed functions critical to the judicial process, immunity
was meant to ensure that these functions could be performed properly. The intended consequence
was that the outcome of the proceedings would be a fair one for the parties involved.
56. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, was later codified in part as 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
57. The thirteenth amendment of the Constitution abolished slavery and empowered Con-
gress to enforce this abolition. Comment, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism,
90 HARV. L. Rav. 1133, 1143 (1977). Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27,
the legislation upon which section 1983 was modeled, was enacted to enforce the thirteenth
amendment by providing criminal liability for violations of individual rights by persons acting
under color of state law. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1866).
The fourteenth amendment was necessary to silence arguments that the measures enacted to
enforce the thirteenth amendment were in excess of Congress' constitutional authority. The four-
teenth amendment granted a federal guarantee for certain privileges of individuals. The fifteenth
amendment protected voting rights, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, allowed
federal troops to watch the polls. Comment, supra, at 1142-47.
58. During the debates, a report nearly 600 pages long was available describing acts of the
Ku Klux Klan against blacks and Union sympathizers. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).
Examples of crimes committed against blacks included murders, whippings, lynchings, CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (Rep. Lowe), and destruction of houses, id. at 428 (Rep.
Beatty).
59. "It is said that the states are not doing the objectionable acts. This argument is more
specious than real .... What practical security would this provision give if it could do no more
than to abrogate and nullify overt acts and legislation of a State?" CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 375 (1871) (Rep. Lowe). "The State, from lack of power or inclination, practically denied
the equal protection of the law to these persons." .d. at 428 (Rep. Beatty). "The state courts,
mainly under the influence of [the Ku Klux Klan] are utterly powerless then." Id. at 653 (Sen.
Osborn).
But it is a fact, asserted in the report, that of the hundreds of outrages committed upon
loyal people through the agency of this Ku Klux organization not one has been pun-
ished. This defect in the administration of the laws does not extend to other cases. Vig-
orously enough are the laws enforced against Union people. They only fail in efficiency
when a man of known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes their aid. Then Justice
closes the door of her temples.
Id. at 505 (Sen. Pratt).
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laws. 60 In response to a request by President Grant for a legislative solution
to this problem, 61 Congress provided in section 1983 a federal tort remedy for
violations of constitutional rights by state officials. 62
Seventy years after the enactment of section 1983 the Supreme Court first
dealt with the apparent conflict between the language of the Act and common-
law defenses of immunity. In Tenney v. Brandhove63 the Court reasoned that
Congress would have explicitly abolished common-law immunities "well
grounded in history and reason '64 had it meant to do so. Therefore, it held
that state legislators acting within the scope of their duties were absolutely
immune from liability under section 1983.65 This rule was based on the pub-
lic interest in effective representation, which required that legislators be able to
perform their duties uninhibited by fear of civil liability.66 Absolute, as op-
60. "While one main scourge of the evil-perhaps the leading one-was the Ku Klux Klan,
the remedy created was not a remedy against it or its members but against those who representing
a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961).
Examples of conduct by state officials that section 1983 was intended to deter were cited in
the legislative debates:
Now, it is an effectual denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws when any
class of officers charged under the laws with their administration permanently and as a
rule refuse to extend that protection. If every sheriff in South Carolina refuses to serve a
writ for a colored man and those sheriffs are kept in office year after year by the people
of South Carolina, and no verdict against them for their failure of duty can be obtained
before a South Carolina jury, the State of South Carolina, through the class of officers
who are its representatives to afford the equal protection of the laws to that class of
citizens, has denied that protection. If the jurors of South Carolina constantly and as a
rule refuse to do justice between man and man where the rights of a particular class of its
citizens are concerned, and that State affords by its legislation no remedy, that is as much
a denial to that class of citizens of the equal protection of the laws as if the State itself put
on its statute-book a statute enacting that no verdict should be rendered in the courts of
that State in favor of this class of citizens.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871) (Rep. Hoar).
61. A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and
roperty insecure and the carrying of the mails and collection of the revenue dangerous.
he proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the
Senate. That the power to correct hese evils is beyond the control of State authorities I
do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United States, acting within the
limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I
urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually
secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United
States ....
Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167, 172-73 (1961) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244
(1871) (Pres. Grant)).
62. Beyond these brief statements, the interpretation of legislative intent becomes controver-
sial. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
63. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). In Tenney plaintiff alleged that defendants, members of the state
legislature, had attempted to intimidate him from exercising his constitutional right of free speech
by making him testify before them. Id. at 369, 371.
64. Id. at 376.
65. See id. at 379.
66. Id. at 373-74 (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) ("These privileges are se-
cured . . . to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the
functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal."))
One commentator suggested that the justification for legislative immunity relied on by several
courts was that legislative proceedings were seen to be judicial in nature, but that there were
significant distinctions that make this analogy questionable. Veeder, supra note 2, at 487 (citing
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posed to qualified, immunity was necessary because "[tjhe privilege would be
of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience
and distraction of a trial . . . or to the hazard of a judgment against them
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives.", 67 The Court did not address
immunity of other public officials under section 1983.
The Tenney rationale was extended to offer immunity to judges in Pierson
v. Ray.68 Again relying on common law immunity principles, the Pierson
Court held that state judges were absolutely immune from liability for judicial
acts.69 The rule was a response to the public interest in allowing judges to
exercise independent judgment, unclouded by intimidation.70 Instead of con-
sidering whether the policies underlying section 1983 opposed application of
the common-law rule, the Court stated simply that "[w]e do not believe...
this settled principle of law was abolished by Section 1983." 71
The Supreme Court refined its analysis of section 1983 immunity in Im-
b/er v. Pachtman, and extended absolute immunity to state prosecutors in initi-
ating prosecutions.72 Rather than automatically adopting a rule found to be
well supported by history as in Tenney and Pierson, the Court developed a
two-step analysis. First, the Court determined that at common law prosecu-
tors enjoyed absolute immunity.73 The next step was to consider whether the
policies supporting immunity at common law justified the same immunity
under section 1983. To answer this question required a balancing of "'the
evils inevitable in either alternative.' -174 The balance fell in favor of applica-
tion of common-law immunity because the accused had protections other than
the section 1983 remedy to ensure a fair trial: post-trial procedures to evaluate
the fairness of the trial75 and criminal sanctions to deter the deprivation of
constitutional rights.76 The Court reasoned further that less than absolute im-
Sheppard v. Bryant, 191 Mass. 591, 28 N.E. 394 (1906); Wright v. Lothrop, 149 Mass. 385, 21 N.E.
963 (1889)).
67. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
68. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Defendant in Pierson, a municipal police justice, convicted plain-
tiffs, members of a racially mixed group of clergymen, of breaching the peace after they had
attempted to use segregated facilities at a bus terminal. Id.
69. Id. at 554-55.
70. Id. at 554 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871), which granted absolute
immunity to judges in an action not brought under section 1983). Bradley disregarded dicta in
two earlier opinions, Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868), and White v. Nicholls, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 266, 286-88 (1845), both of which espoused a standard of qualified immunity for
judges.
71. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
72. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). In 1mbler plaintiff alleged that defendant, a state prosecuting attor-
ney, had caused plaintiff to be convicted of murder by the prosecutor's knowing use of false testi-
mony and suppression of evidence.
73. Id. at 422.
74. Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950)).
75. "These procedures include the remedial powers of the trial judge, appellate review, and
state and federal post-conviction collateral remedies. In all of these the attention of the reviewingjudge or tribunal is focused primarily on whether there was a fair trial under law." Imbler, 424
U.S. at 427.
76. See id. at 429. The criminal counterpart to section 1983 is 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976), which
states:
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munity would inhibit a prosecutor's vigorous performance of his duties, be-
cause in "a close case ... an acquittal likely would trigger a suit against [the
prosecutor] for damages."' 77 Although it refused to address the issue of immu-
nity for prosecutors in administrative or investigative roles, the Court alluded
to the functional analysis more clearly articulated in later opinions.78 In a
concurring opinion, Justice White stated that witnesses also should be abso-
lutely immune from section 1983 liability. 7 9
The Court focused on a functional analysis for the first time in Butz v.
Economou,80 which is relevant even though it was not a section 1983 action.81
Butz raised the question whether immunity should be extended to administra-
tive law judges. The Court explained that, as with judges in the judicial
branch, the function of an administrative law judge requires independence of
judgment, which, in the absence of absolute immunity, might be jeopardized
by the threat of a lawsuit by the losing party.82 Rather than accept a decision
as sound, the irate party was likely to "ascri[be] improper motives to the
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such in-
habitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the
punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life.
77. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426 n.24.
78. Id. at 430-3 1.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent's activities were intimately associ-
ated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the
reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. We have no occasion to consider
whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's
responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather
than that of advocate.
Id.
See also Comment, Section 1983 and Prosecutorial Immunity, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 81, 86
(1981) (observes that the 1mbler Court acknowledged the functional approach without comment-
ing about its applicability). But cf Comment, Supplementing the Functional Test of Prosecutorial
Immunity, 34 STAN. L. REv. 487, 489 (1982) (argues that the Court not only recognized, but actu-
ally expressed approval of, the functional test).
79. 1mbler, 424 U.S. at 432 (White, J., concurring). Justice White argued further that the
Court's decision actually could contravene the policy underlying immunity by extending absolute
immunity to prosecutors accused of suppressing evidence. Id. at 433.
An analogous argument could be made against witness immunity, because protecting wit-
nesses who intentionally fail to disclose what they know works against the policy of ascertainment
of the truth.
80. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). In Butz the plaintiff alleged that action by several officials of the
Department of Agriculture had interfered with the operation of his commodity futures commis-
sion company. Id. at 480-83.
81. The cause of action in Butz was based on a precedent established in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents, 403 U.S. 384, 392-97 (1971). Bivens created a civil remedy against federal
officials for violations of constitutional rights. Immunity issues similar to those that arise under
section 1983 actions also arise frequently in Bivens actions. The Butz Court stated that "[w]e
deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought
against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against fed-
eral officials." Butz, 438 U.S. at 504.
82. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 509.
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judge. '8 3 The Court explained that absolute immunity "stems from the char-
acteristics of the judicial process rather than its location" within a particular
branch of the government.8 4 Thus, the Court held that because administra-
tive judicial officials were "functionally comparable"85 to judges, they were
entitled to the same protection accorded state judges.8 6 Despite this emphasis
on a functional approach, the Court in Butz also employed a balancing analy-
sis to consider justifications for granting absolute immunity from liability for
constitutional violations.87 The Court stressed the presence of safeguards in
the judicial process to deter official misconduct.88 It found that "[iun light of
these safeguards,. . . the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an
agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the in-
dependent judgment of these men and women."8 9 In dictum the Court stated
that the policies underlying absolute immunity for judges also supported abso-
lute immunity for witnesses and advocates. 90
As its analysis has evolved, the Court, for purposes of immunity analysis,
has distinguished between activities within the judicial process and those
outside it. Activities "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the crim-
inal process. . .[are] functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity
apply with full force." 91 A standard of qualified immunity was adopted, how-
ever, in several cases of alleged constitutional violations by public officials not
performing roles within the judicial process. 92 The distinction was based on
two rationales. First, the danger that the adversarial nature of the judicial
process would lead to frequent allegations of improper motive supports abso-
lute immunity for participants in judicial proceedings. 93 Withholding abso-
83. Id. (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 348 (1871)).
84. Id. at 512.
85. Id. at 513.
86. See id. at 514.
87. See id. at 508. "In each case we have undertaken 'a considered inquiry into the immunity
historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it."' (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421).
88. These safeguards are "[t]he insulation of the judge from political influence, the impor-
tance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the cor-
rectability of error on appeal ...." Id. at 512.
One commentator read these safeguards as an integral part of the Butz holding, which modi-
fied 1mbler and the common law. This interpretation was that the remedial purpose of section
1983 was outweighed only when adequate means existed to deter misconduct. Comment, Section
1983 and Prosecutorial Immunity, supra note 78, at 87.
89. Butz, 438 U.S. at 514.
90. See id. at 512. The reasoning behind immunity for judges is that they can adjudicate
more objectively if they have no reason to fear liability. Similarly, witnesses and advocates should
be able to perform their roles more effectively if they are unrestrained by the threat of a lawsuit.
91. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. A policeman performs a function outside the judicial process
when he makes an arrest: he performs a function within the judicial process when he is in a
courtroom testifying as a witness. See id. at 430 n.32.
92. These roles outside the judicial process included police officers making an arrest, execu-
tive officials, school board members, hospital superintendents, and prison administrators. See in-fra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 77 & 83. Because there is a clear loser in litigation,
the activities of participants in litigation are more likely to lead to retaliation than are the activities
of participants in official functions taking place outside of court.
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lute immunity from other officials, however, resulted from the policy
embodied in section 1983 that "government officials, as a class, could not be
totally exempt, by virtue of some absolute immunity, from liability under [the
terms of section 1983]."94
The Court first granted qualified immunity under section 1983 in Pierson
v. Ray.95 The Pierson Court, again adhering to common-law principles,
granted immunity qualified by good faith and probable cause to police officers
making an arrest.96 In a later case, Scheuer v. Rhodes,97 the Court applied an
analysis similar to the balancing approach adopted in subsequent absolute im-
munity cases: "Final resolution of this question must take into account the
functions and responsibilities of these particular defendants. . . as well as the
purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983."98 The Court, allowing only qualified immunity,
refused to extend absolute immunity to high ranking state executives, because
such a decision would render section 1983 effectively meaningless.99 Some
degree of protection was necessary, however, because of "the injustice, partic-
ularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is
required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion [and]
the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to exe-
cute his office with decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good."1° In later cases, this rationale of protecting officials whose positions
require a great deal of discretion, supported extension of qualified immunity
to school board members,' 0' state hospital superintendents, 10 2 and prison
administrators.10 3
94. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974).
95. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Pierson policemen arrested demonstrators against racial segrega-
tion and charged them with breaching the peace.
96. See id. at 557.
97. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In Scheuer section 1983 actions were filed on behalf of three stu-
dents killed at Kent State University. The suits were brought against the Governor of Ohio and
several members of the Ohio National Guard.
98. Id. at 243. Scheuer was decided before Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1975), the case
in which the Court clearly articulated its balancing approach for the first time.
99. Under the criteria developed by precedents of this Court, § 1983 would be drained of
meaning were we to hold that the acts of a governor or other high executive officer have
"the quality of a supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights of
property and unreviewable through the judicial power of the Federal Government."
Id. at 248 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932)).
100. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.
101. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood members of a school board expelled
plaintiffs from a high school for violating a school regulation against the use of alcohol at school
activities. The Court held that defendants were immune unless they "knew or reasonably should
have known that the action ... would violate the constitutional rights of [plaintiffs] or if [they]
took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights." Id. at
322.
102. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In O'Connor a mental patient confined in
a hospital brought a section 1983 action against the hospital superintendent for "intentionally and
maliciously depriv[ing] him of his constitutional right to liberty." Id. at 565. The Court adopted
the same test of qualified immunity stated in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See supra
note 101.
103. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). In Procunier a prison inmate charged three
subordinate officials of the prison, the director of the Department of Corrections, the warden and
the assistant warden with violating plaintiffs constitutional rights by interfering with his mail. The
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Because the Supreme Court had made no clear statement concerning the
proper immunity analysis under section 1983, the lower courts had reached
conflicting results on the issue of witness immunity. A common feature of the
lower courts' decisions was, however, that none applied the strict functional
test the Supreme Court later used in Briscoe. After the Court stated its balanc-
ing test in 1mbler, the lower courts uniformly applied that analysis rather than
a functional one. 104
Applying this balancing approach, most circuit courts had adopted a stan-
dard of absolute immunity for witnesses, reasoning that the need for uninhib-
ited disclosure by witnesses was as important in a constitutional tort action as
in a common law suit.10 5 Strong arguments against blocking section 1983 lia-
bility, however, were frequently made. These arguments fell into three catego-
ries. One view was that the policy of protecting witnesses applied with less
force when the constitutional rights of a private citizen were violated by a
public employee.' 0 6 Support for this position that government officials acting
as witnesses should be treated differently from private witnesses was derived
from the fact that "both Congress and the Supreme Court ha[d] created special
causes of action to provide a remedy for official misconduct which infringe[d]
constitutionally protected interests." 10 7 A second contention was that witness
immunity was not necessary for government officials because giving complete
and truthful testimony required no exercise of discretion.108 Protection of
Court granted defendants immunity qualified by good faith and reasonable belief that they had
committed no constitutional violation. Id. at 561-62.
104. See Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. pending, No. 81-1881; Briscoe v.
LaHue, 663 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983); Myers v. Bull, 599 F.2d 863 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 901 (1979) (not addressing the issue but holding that witnesses do not
act under color of state law); Burke v. Miller, 580 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
930 (1979); Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that a witness in a civil rights
action enjoys absolute immunity but offering no analysis); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976)
(Bivens action).
105. Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1982), cert pending, No. 81-1881; Briscoe v.
LaHue, 663 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981), aft'd, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983); Myers v. Bull, 559 F.2d 863 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 901 (1979); Burke v. Miller, 580 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 930 (1979); Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1978); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d
830 (3d Cir. 1976).
Two decisions expressly rejected absolute immunity for government officials acting as wit-
nesses: Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); Hil-
liard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 424 U.S.
961, aj'd on remand, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1976).
106. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978). In
Briggs plaintiff alleged that a prosecutor made false statements in a hearing that related to a grand
jury investigation. The court held that a prosecutor would have only qualified immunity when he
was not performing a prosecutorial function. In ruling that defendant's actions were not within
the prosecutorial function, the court stated that "absolute immunity is not to be extended to the
constitutional tort contest absent the most compelling justification." Id.
107. Id. The causes of action referred to are the section 1983 action and the Bivens action. See
supra note 81.
108. Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1982) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (citing Bris-
coe v. Lahue, 663 F.2d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. pending, No. 81-1881). In Charles a police
officer was accused of concealing evidence that would have exculpated plaintiff. The court held
that witnesses were absolutely immune from liability. Id. at 666. The dissent argued that the
degree of immunity depended on the degree of discretion the defendant was required to exercise
in performing his official function. Since a witness exercised no greater discretion than a police-
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"the fearless exercise of discretion"' 0 9 had been an important consideration
justifying absolute immunity in cases under section 1983. The final position
was that public officials were less likely than private witnesses to be intimi-
dated by the threat of liability because these officials "face the possibility of
liability for most of their official acts, . . . may be obligated to testify as an
aspect of their official duties, and . . . are normally represented by govern-
ment counsel in § 1983 actions.' 10
Faced with this diversity of opinion among the lower courts and the am-
biguity in its own opinions, the Supreme Court in Briscoe v. LaHue aban-
doned the balancing approach in favor of a strict functional analysis. In
reverting to its stance in Tenney and Pierson, the Court applied the common
law rule without weighing policies that might justify an exception."I '
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Briscoe with an examination of
the common law of immunity for judicial participants. The Court found that
at common law absolute immunity protected parties, witnesses, attorneys, jury
members, and judges from liability. 112 Such immunity, as it applied to wit-
nesses, was based on the policy of encouraging full disclosure, uninhibited by
the threat of liability, so that "the paths which lead to the ascertainment of
truth [will] be left as free and unobstructed as possible."'"13 An intimidated
witness would "be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential
plaintiff [in a retaliatory lawsuit against the witness]." "14 Similarly, immunity
for court officials allowed them to exercise independent judgment without fear
of retaliation. 1 5 The Court concluded that whether police witnesses were
considered official participants in the judicial process or private witnesses, they
were entitled to absolute immunity. 16
While the Court's discussion was historically accurate, the focus should
have been on the standard of immunity as it appeared to Congress immedi-
ately preceding the enactment of section 1983. As Justice Marshall pointed
out, in 1871 the only statements by the Supreme Court on the issue of immu-
man performing any other function, a police witness should be entitled only to qualified immu-
nity. Id.
109. Briscoe v. Lahue, 663 F.2d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original), atd, 103 S. Ct.
1108 (1983).
110. Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 669 (5th Cir. 1982) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (quoting
Briscoe v. Lahue, 663 F.2d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. pendng, No. 81-1881).
111. The Court mentioned arguments in favor of the common law rule only after making it
clear that its decision rested on a functional analysis. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1119. The Court
refused to discuss contrary arguments. Id.
112. Id. at 1115-16 (citing King v. Skinner, 98 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B. 1772)).
113. Id. at 1114 (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860)).
114. Id. at 1115 (citing Veeder, supra note 2, at 470).
The analogous situation of prosecutors is that a prosecutor, in the absence of immunity,
might be inclined towards fewer prosecutions, because he is more likely to be sued when he prose-
cutes than when he chooses not to prosecute. See Note, supra note 3, at 181.
115. Briscoe 103 S. Ct. at 1116 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978)).
116. Id. at 1116. The Court implied that the preferred classification was that of private wit-
nesses when it said that one reason for denial of recovery here was that the reach of section 1983
"is limited to actions taken 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory. . . .' It is beyond question that, when a private party gives testimony in
open court in a criminal trial, that act is not performed 'under color of law."' Id. at 1112-13.
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nity appeared in White v. Nicholls' 17 and seemed to indicate that judicial par-
ticipants were not entitled to absolute immunity, but to immunity in the
absence of malice."1 8 Although the Court's comments in White were only
dicta (later to be overruled) this does not destroy their value for revealing
legislative intent. In 1871 Congress probably would have concluded that the
standard of immunity for witnesses and court officials was one of qualified
immunity. 119
In its analysis of the legislative history, the Court concluded that because
an examination of the language of the statute 120 and the legislative debates
revealed "no reference to the type of alleged constitutional deprivation at issue
in this case: perjury by a government official leading to an unjust convic-
tion," 121 Congress did not intend section 1983 to apply to the situation in Bris-
coe. The Court's approach was flawed in two respects: its requirement of a
specific reference and its failure to find one. Section 1983 was intended as a
broad remedial device; 122 Congress could not have been expected to anticipate
and comment on every situation that might arise to require judicial construc-
tion of the Act. 123 The Court, however, should have found comments in the
debates that were relevant to liability for court officials under section 1983.
Liability for judges was specifically mentioned, without contradiction, in the
debates.' 24 Furthermore, the sponsor of the Act, Representative Shel-
lanbarger, stated that section 1983 was modeled after section 2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,125 which the Court admitted "makes clear that judges and
other 'state officials integral to the judicial process' are subject to criminal lia-
bility for violating the constitutional rights of individuals."' 126 Shellanbarger
117. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
118. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1124-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 523 (1868), also seemed to adopt a standard of qualified immunity, three years before the
enactment of section 1983. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. The state courts were
divided on the issue of qualified versus absolute immunity. See Comment, supra note 57, at 1201.
119. The Court did not clearly adopt a standard of absolute immunity until Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871), decided after the enactment of section 1983; see also Comment,
Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969) (argues that section 1983
was intended to allow only qualified immunity for judicial officers).
120. See Veeder, supra note 2, at 472 ("It is always clear. . . whether absolute or qualified
privilege is referred to by the absence or presence in the statute of reference to the term malice.").
121. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1118.
The distinction the Court makes between acquittal and conviction is not significant, because
the deprivation of constitutional rights is at least as great when peijury deprives an innocent de-
fendant of his freedom as when it allows a guilty defendant to go free.
122. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 68 (1871) (comments of Rep. Sbl1labarger)
("This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and huma!6 rights. All
statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficiently
construed.").
123. See id. at app. 67 (comments of Rep. Shellabarger) ("And he would have an inadequate
comprehension of the magnitude of the debate... who did not enter it with extreme.., doubt
. as to his ability to thoroughly explore and consider the questions we approach."). See also
Comment, supra note 57, at 1156 (suggests that the vague language of the statute may have been
intentional to allow the courts to interpret it).
124. See Comment, supra note 119, at 328 n.39 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess.
217 (Sen. Thurman), 385 (Rep. Lewis), 365-66 (Rep. Arthur) (1871)).
125. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 68 (1871).
126. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1118 n.26 (emphasis in original).
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went on to say that "section [2 of the Civil Rights Act] provides a criminal
proceeding in identically the same case as [section 1983] provides a civil rem-
edy."127 Rather than deal with these comments, which seem to indicate a leg-
islative intent to override the common law of immunity, the Court avoided the
issue. 128
Having concluded that both the common law of immunity and the legis-
lative history of section 1983 support absolute immunity for police witnesses,
the Court began the final portion of its opinion indicating that it would con-
sider policy arguments that might justify an exception. The Court quickly
made clear, however, that its decision would not be based on these policy ar-
guments, but that "immunity analysis rests on functional categories."1 29 Rea-
soning that a police witness "performs the same functions as any other
witness," the Court extended absolute immunity to police officers acting as
witnesses.130 This strict functional analysis did not consider the competing
policies that have made immunity to section 1983 liability so controversial.
For instance, the Court refused to address the very serious problem of police
perjury.131 Prosecutors are often reluctant to prosecute police officers for per-
jury because of the desire to maintain a close working relationship with the
police.' 32 Thus, police witnesses may be able to lie with impunity, and one of
the safeguards relied on in Butz to justify absolute immunity disappears in the
case of police witnesses. 133 Furthermore, the petitioner's arguments that poli-
cies underlying absolute immunity apply with less force to police officers de-
served consideration.1 34 As the dissent pointed out, police perjury is
particularly harmful because a police officer has more credibility with the jury
than does an ordinary witness.135 A further consideration is that a police wit-
ness is less likely to be inhibited by fear of subsequent liability because testify-
ing is a normal duty of a policeman and defense against charges based on
127. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871).
128. The Court devoted most of its discussion to section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch.
22, 17 Stat. 13, which was intended to provide federal remedies for conspiracies by the Ku Klux
Klan. The Court implied that the comments relied on by the dissent applied to section 2, not
section 7 (current section 1983). Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1117-18.
129. Id. at 1119 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-14). Butz, however, also incorporated a balanc-
ing analysis. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
A "functional category" is a category of potential defendants who perform the same function.
130. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1119.
131. See Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel- Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the
Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 409 (concludes that although empirical evi-
dence is rare, police perjury is common); Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A
New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971).
132. See Neuman, Suing the Law Breakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L. 447, 449-50 (1978) (argument by United
States' district judge that the criminal sanction is not effective as a deterrent). But frequent prose-
cutions are not necessary to deter misconduct. Indictment alone can severely harm an official's
career. See Note, supra note 3, at 203 n.248.
133. "Witnesses are, of course, subject to. . .the penalty of perjury." Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Section 1983 and Prosecutorial
Immunity, supra note 78, at 87 (argues that after Butz, the need for absolute immunity outweighed
the purpose of section 1983 only when adequate safeguards exist to deter misconduct).
134. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1119. See also supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
135. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1131 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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official conduct would be provided by government counsel. 136 The Court
stated that "[t]hese contentions have some force," implying that, had it applied
the Imbler balancing approach, the result might have been a lesser immu-
nity.' 37 By applying a functional test, the Court avoided having to balance
factors on both sides of the immunity issue; however, the common-law rule
that the Court automatically adopted under its functional approach may need
reevaluation in light of current concern about police perjury. As Justice
Holmes once noted, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule than
that. . . it was laid down in the time of Henry IV... and [that it] simply
persists from the blind imitation of the past."'138
A further criticism of Briscoe is that by failing to adhere to the approach
used in its recent precedents, 139 the Court has created confusion about the
proper analysis of immunity in section 1983 cases. 140 It seems illogical to deal
with competing policies in some cases but to circumvent policy arguments in
others by using a strict functional analysis. Courts will have to consider the
extent to which the balancing approach has been abandoned, for despite its
use of a different analysis in Briscoe, the Court has not explicitly rejected the
balancing approach. The question whether that approach has any remaining
vitality is likely to arise in the related line of cases that have applied a balanc-
ing analysis to section 1983 claims against public officials not "intimately asso-
ciated"'14 1 with the judicial process.' 42
Despite these criticisms, Briscoe serves two purposes not fully explained
in the opinion. First, the strict functional test prevents uncertainty that could
undermine the purpose of witness immunity. Freedom from intimidation de-
pends on confidence that no liability will follow. A clear rule protecting all
witnesses conveys this confidence. The Briscoe Court expressed a concern
about the boundaries of any proposed exception.' 43 A balancing approach
136. Id. at 1132. See also Comment, supra note 119, at 337 (suggesting that the government
might assume the liability if government officials are not immune). Financial expense is not the
only risk, however, because the damage to the official's reputation from a lawsuit could seriously
jeopardize his career.
137. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1119.
138. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
139. See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text. See also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981). Newport, which the Court cites to support application of the common-law
rule, also adopts a balancing approach. Id. at 258-59 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424).
140. One lower court has addressed the issue of witness immunity under section 1983 since the
Supreme Court decided Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983). In Stevens v. Brown, 564 F. Supp. 368
(W.D.N.C. 1983), three police officers were alleged to have conspired to convict a criminal defend-
ant through the use of perjured testimony. The district court found that Briscoe was not relevant
to the question whether police officers were immune from section 1983 liability for conspiring
together and obtaining a conviction by using false testimony. Id. at 369. Although there was
insufficient evidence of conspiracy and false testimony, the court stated that it would not have
extended immunity to the police officers in this case, because the action was based on conspiracy
prior to trial rather than perjury during trial. Id. at 370.
141. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Activities "intimately associated with" the judicial process are
those involved in the actual litigation, for example: adjudicating, prosecuting, testifying, defend-
ing, and fact finding.
142. A standard of qualified immunity was adopted in those cases. See supra notes 97-103 and
accompanying text.
143. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1119 n.27.
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would obscure the rule of witness immunity by creating nebulous categories of
protected and unprotected witnesses. If litigation were necessary in each case
to determine whether a witness was entitled to immunity, then any immunity
granted would be illusory because the threat of consequent litigation would
intimidate the witnesses. Similarly, the qualified immunity usually accorded a
public official would be an inadequate substitute for absolute immunity. Be-
cause a hearing would be required to determine state of mind, qualified immu-
nity would amount to "no immunity at all."' 44 Absolute immunity, in
contrast, defeats a suit at its initiation. The clarity of the strict functional anal-
ysis, allowing absolute immunity for all witnesses, promotes the policy of "as-
certainment of the truth."'145
Another factor underlying the decision is the proliferation of litigation in
federal courts. 146 The Court focused on this problem when it stated that
"[t]his category of § 1983 litigation might well impose significant burdens on
the judicial system."' 147 In light of the current concern for the burgeoning
federal caseload, it it not suprising that the Court was reluctant to open the
door for a new class of section 1983 claims, a number of which it expects to be
spurious. 48 Had the Briscoe Court allowed section 1983 claims against cer-
tain types of witnesses, a rash of lawsuits would likely follow as plaintiffs
tested the limits of the Court's ruling. Furthermore, conservation of judicial
resources is a major purpose of immunity. 149 The Briscoe rule promotes this
144. Butz, 438 U.S. 478, 520 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citingImbler, 424 U.S. at 419
n.13).
145. "The claims of the individual must yield to the dictates of public policy, which requires
that the paths which lead to the ascertainment of the truth should be left as free and unobstructed
as possible." Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wise. 193, 197 (1860), quotedin Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1114.
Overall, this policy will be furthered, even though the application of the rule actually may
work against the policy in certain cases. As one commentator said about immunity:
[A]n inflexible rule oflaw may on occasion result in hardship to individuals. Any princi-
ple that is universal in its application may sometimes be harsh in its consequences. But
where the reasons on which it is based are plain and unmistakable, individual interests
must yield to the commanding dictates of public policy.
Veeder, supra note 2, at 467.
146. The number of civil rights cases filed in federal district courts has increased from 296 in
the fiscal year ended June 30, 1961 to 17,038 in the same period in 1982 (an increase of 10.5% over
the previous year). REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S. COURTS 1982, 108. (Official
statistics on civil rights litigation do not distinguish between section 1983 filings and other civil
rights filings.)
Partly responsible for an increase in section 1983 litigation was the Supreme Court's 1961
decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See, Comment, supra note 57, at 1169, 1172. See
also McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitu-
tional Protections, Part !, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1974) (estimates that in 1972 there were about
8000 claims filed under section 1983 alone). In Monroe plaintiffs alleged that defendants, police
officers, broke into plaintiffs' house, humiliated plaintiffs, damaged their property, and took them
into custody without a search warrant or an arrest warrant. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169. The Court
held that even a state official acting outside of his authority under color of state law could come
within the language of section 1983: "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory." Id. at 168.
147. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1120.
148. Id.
149. See Comment, The Proper Scope of the Cii Rights Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1295
n.54 (1953) ("Among the arguments. . . in support of immunity [is]. . . the drain on the valuable
time of the official caused by insubstantial suits .. "); Note, supra note 3, at 191
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end by cutting off a number of lawsuits likely to be based on retaliatory mo-
tives or meritless distinctions.
After Briscoe any abolition of absolute witness immunity for specific cate-
gories of public officials will have to come from Congress. Legislation could
prevent uncertainty by identifying classes not entitled to protection. Proceed-
ing on a case-by-case basis, the Supreme Court is unable to speak as clearly as
Congress, and lack of a coherent rule contravenes the policy of witness immu-
nity. Furthermore, the Court is bound by precedent not to make the sweeping
changes the public may demand. The Court acknowledged this constraint in
Briscoe: "[w]e are not writing on a clean slate, and it is not for us to craft a
new rule. .. Congress has the power to fashion an appropriate remedy if it
perceives the need for one." 150 One option open to Congress to deal with this
problem of frivolous litigation would be to create a quasi-judicial system to
screen out claims that appear meritless.15
The decision in Briscoe was probably the proper one under the circum-
stances. A judicial creation of exceptions to absolute witness immunity would
nullify the beneficial effects of the rule: to promote uninhibited testimony by
witnesses and to prevent the proliferation of unnecessary litigation. The
Court's analysis, however, left questions unanswered concerning how immu-
nity should be analyzed under section 1983. The analysis in Briscoe was dif-
ferent from that applied by the Court in earlier cases, but the Court failed to
reconcile these divergent approaches. Furthermore, the Court's clear preserva-
tion of witness immunity under section 1983 did not resolve the conflict be-
tween the policy of encouraging full disclosure at trial and the policy of
providing a tort remedy for constitutional violations. Only new legislation can
adequately resolve this conflict, by stating a clear rule and a workable proce-
dure to implement it.
FRANKLIN MILLER WILLIAMS
('[P]rosecutorial immunity is based, in part, on the desire to avoid the drain on official time and
energy occasioned by the necessity of defending frivolous suits."); Note, Governmental lmmunity-
Prosecuting Attorney, 6 AM. J. CRiM. L. 213, 222 (1978) ("[A] major purpose of the immunity
doctrine ... is to avoid consumption of the prosecutor's time in defeating frivolous lawsuits.").
150. Briscoe, 103 S. Ct. at 1120 n.30.
151. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 308, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, J., dis-
senting), Justice Burger proposed a similar statutory scheme to: (1) remove sovereign immunity,
(2) create a cause of action for violation of constitutional rights by federal agents under the fourth
amendment, and (3) create a quasi-judicial tribunal to adjudicate these claims. See Note, supra
note 3, at 204 (suggesting legislative solution to conflict between immunity and section 1983).
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